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In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory, there are no frictions ex
post (i.e., after non-contractible investments have been sunk). In contrast, in
transaction cost economics ex-post frictions play a central role. In this note,
we bring the property rights theory closer to transaction cost economics by
allowing for ex-post moral hazard. As a consequence, central conclusions of
the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory may be overturned. In particular, even
though only party A has to make an investment decision, B-ownership can
yield higher investment incentives. Moreover, ownership matters even when
investments are fully relationship-specic (i.e., when they have no impact
on the parties disagreement payo¤s).
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1 Introduction
Why do some transactions take place within rms, while other transactions
take place in the market? The leading answer to this question in modern
economic theory builds on the idea that contracts are incomplete, as formal-
ized by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995)
in their seminal property rights approach.1 When contracts are incomplete,
ownership rights matter in future negotiations, because they determine what
will happen in the case of disagreement. Anticipating the outcome of tomor-
rows negotiations, a party that will be in a better bargaining position has
stronger incentives to make non-contractible investments today.
A central conclusion of the theory is that if only party A has to make an
investment decision, then ownership by party B cannot yield higher invest-
ment incentives than ownership by party A. Moreover, ownership matters
only if investments have an inuence on the parties disagreement payo¤s.
Thus, if investments are fully relationship-specic (i.e., they are worthless
when the parties do not collaborate), the ownership structure is irrelevant
for the investment incentives.
The property rights theory has been criticized because there are no ex-
post frictions, which play a central role in traditional transaction cost eco-
nomics. Specically, Williamson (2002, p. 188) has pointed out that the
assumption that there are no ex-post frictions is deeply problematic and
that it is the most consequential di¤erence (Williamson, 2000, p. 605)
between the property rights theory and transaction cost economics.
In the present paper, we bring the property rights theory closer to trans-
action cost economics by introducing an ex-post moral hazard problem.
It turns out that central conclusions of the property rights theory can be
overturned. Ownership by a non-investing party can lead to higher invest-
1Indeed, according to Andrei Shleifer the incomplete contracts approach represents
perhaps the most inuential advance in economic theory in the last thirty years (see the
back cover of Aghion et al., 2016).
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ment incentives, and ownership matters even when investments are fully
relationship-specic.
Related literature. While the present paper adds a moral hazard problem
to the Grossman-Hart-Moore setup, other papers have added an adverse
selection problem. For instance, in Schmitz (2006, 2017) a party learns
private information about its disagreement payo¤ after the investment stage,
while in Su (2017) there is asymmetric information at the outset already.
In the literature investigating contractual solutions to hold-up problems,
Goltsman (2011) studies the role of asymmetric information, while Schmitz
(2012) studies the role of moral hazard. These papers do not explore the
implications of di¤erent ownership arrangements.
The present paper is complementary to Mori (2018), who also combines
the property rights theory with transaction cost economics. Mori (2018)
studies an incomplete contracting setup with sequential investments in order
to model a trade-o¤ between ex-ante investments and ex-post adaptations.
Moral hazard does not play a role in his model.
The source of the ex post frictions in our setup is a moral hazard problem
with limited liability.2 See Innes (1990) and Pitchford (1998) for early papers
on moral hazard with limited liability.3 In contrast to the present paper, in
this literature complete contracting models are studied.
2 The model
There are two risk-neutral parties, A and B. For instance, party A might
have the human capital to conduct research in the eld of biotechnology,
while party B might be a large pharmaceutical company. Following Aghion
and Tirole (1994) and Tirole (1999), suppose that party A has no wealth
and is protected by limited liability. At date 0, an ownership structure o 2
2For a di¤erent formalization of ex-post haggling, see the recent work by Mori (2017).
3For more recent papers on moral hazard problems with limited liability, see e.g. Kräkel
and Schöttner (2016), Pi (2018), or At et al. (2019).
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fA;Bg is xed. If o = A, then party A controls the relevant physical assets
(non-integration). If o = B, then party B has control over the relevant assets
(integration). Following the Grossman-Hart-Moore approach, the parties
cannot yet write an incentive contract at date 0.
At date 1, party A invests e¤ort i 2 [0; 1] in basic research activities.
Party As disutility of e¤ort is given by 1
2
i2. At date 2, the interim outcome
! 2 fL;Hg is realized, where the success probability is given by Prf! =
Hjig = i. The interim outcome determines the expected revenue that can
be generated if a marketable innovation will be developed.
At date 3, the ex-post stage is reached and the parties can negotiate a
contract. At date 4, party A exerts e¤ort e 2 [0; 1] in order to develop a
marketable innovation, where the disutility of e¤ort is given by 1
2
e2. At date
5, the nal outcome  2 f0; 1g is realized, where the success probability is
Prf = 1jeg = e.
When at date 3 the parties agree to collaborate, then the revenue that
they can generate together at date 5 is given by R!, where 0 < RL < RH <
1. When at date 3 the parties do not reach an agreement to collaborate,
then in line with the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory, the parties disagreement
payo¤s depend on the ownership structure.
Suppose rst that o = A (non-integration). In this case, the revenue that
party A can generate without party Bs collaboration at date 5 is given by
r!, where rH < RH and rL  RL. Hence, when party A owns the relevant
assets, it can commercialize the innovation without party Bs human capital,
but the revenues will be smaller. We suppose 0  rH   rL < RH   RL, so
the investment i is relationship-specic; i.e., its e¤ect is larger when the
two parties will collaborate.4 In order to keep the exposition short, we will
assume that rH 
1
2
RH and rL 
1
2
RL.
5 Since party B cannot commercialize
4Note that if rH = rL, the investment i is fully relationship-specic, which means that
it has no e¤ect outside of the relationship.
5If the assumption is dropped, the analysis can be performed in analogy to what
follows, but one has to make some additional case distinctions in Section 4. For brevity,
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the innovation without party A, party Bs disagreement payo¤ is zero.
Now suppose that o = B (integration). In this case, both parties dis-
agreement payo¤s are zero. Since party A does not have access to the rel-
evant assets, it cannot commercialize the innovation on its own. Party B
cannot make a positive prot, because the human capital of party A is in-
dispensable.
Following the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory, we assume
that the parties are symmetrically informed at date 3.6 In line with the
Coase Theorem, the parties will always agree to collaborate, which is ex-
post e¢cient (since R!  r!). Nevertheless, the disagreement payo¤s (and
hence the ownership structure) are important, because they determine the
threatpoint in the date-3 negotiations. Specically, we assume that at date
3, with probability  2 (0; 1) party A can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
to party B, while otherwise party B can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to
party A.7
We will consider two di¤erent scenarios. In scenario I, party As date-4
e¤ort e is veriable; i.e., there is no ex-post moral hazard, as in the standard
Grossman-Hart-Moore theory. In scenario II, only the nal outcome  is
veriable, whereas party As date-4 e¤ort e is a hidden action; i.e., there is
an ex-post moral hazard problem.
The rst-best solution. In a rst-best world, the parties will always col-
laborate. At date 4, the e¤ort level
eFB(!) = argmax eR!  
1
2
e2
= R!
is exerted, and the expected date-3 surplus is 1
2
R2!. At date 1, the investment
we focus on the most interesting case.
6Hence, the interim outcome ! is observable but not veriable. Note that it makes no
di¤erence whether the non-contractible investment level i is observable or unobservable.
7This simple bargaining game has often been used in the related literature, see e.g. Hart
and Moore (1999, p. 135).
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level
iFB = argmax i
1
2
R2H + (1  i)
1
2
R2L  
1
2
i2
=
1
2
(R2H  R
2
L)
is chosen.8
3 Scenario I: No moral hazard
Suppose the date-4 e¤ort e is veriable. Consider rst integration (o = B),
so both parties disagreement payo¤s are zero. At date 3, the parties will
agree on e = eFB(!). The party that can make the date-3 o¤er will extract
the expected date-3 total surplus 1
2
R2!. Hence, at date 1 party A will invest
iB = argmax i
1
2
R2H + (1  i)
1
2
R2L  
1
2
i2
= 
1
2
(R2H  R
2
L):
Next, consider nonintegration (o = A). If the parties do not collaborate,
at date 4 party A will exert e¤ort
e(!) = argmax er!  
1
2
e2
= r!;
so its disagreement payo¤ is 1
2
r2!. Recall that party Bs disagreement payo¤
is zero. When party A can make the o¤er at date 3, it will o¤er to set
e = eFB(!) and extract the expected date-3 total surplus 1
2
R2!. When party
B can make the o¤er, it will also propose e = eFB(!) and it will leave party
A its disagreement payo¤ 1
2
r2!. Hence, at date 1 party A will invest
iA = argmax i
1
2
[R2H + (1  )r
2
H ] + (1  i)
1
2
[R2L + (1  )r
2
L] 
1
2
i2
= 
1
2
(R2H  R
2
L) + (1  )
1
2
(r2H   r
2
L):
8Note that the revenue r! and the bargaining power  do not play a role in a rst-best
world.
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Observe that iB  iA < iFB.9
The following result summarizes the main insights that follow in scenario
I.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is no ex-post moral hazard.
(i) If rH > rL, the date-1 investment is strictly larger under o = A than
under o = B.
(ii) If rH = rL, so the investment i is fully relationship-specic, owner-
ship does not matter (i.e., iA = iB).
These ndings are in line with the standard Grossman-Hart-Moore the-
ory. In particular, since party A is the only party that has to make an in-
vestment decision, A-ownership leady to higher investment incentives than
B-ownership, provided that the investment is not fully relationship-specic.
In the latter case, ownership does not matter.
4 Scenario II: Moral hazard
Now suppose the date-4 e¤ort e is a hidden action. Consider rst integration
(o = B), so both parties disagreement payo¤s are zero. When party A can
make the o¤er at date 3, it will propose a contract according to which at
date 5 party A will get R!, so party A will exert e¤ort e
FB(!) = R! and
its expected date-3 payo¤ is 1
2
R2!. When party B can make the o¤er, it will
propose a contract which says that at date 5 party A will get a payment
t  0 (and party B will get R!   t). It is straightforward to verify that
party B will set t0 = 0 and t1 < 1. Party A will then choose the e¤ort level
that maximizes et1  
1
2
e2, so e = t1. Party B hence proposes a contract
that maximizes t1(R!   t1). Thus, t1 =
1
2
R! and party As expected date-3
9Note that our assumptions imply that r2
H
 r2
L
= (rH rL)(rH+rL) is strictly smaller
than R2
H
 R2
L
= (RH  RL)(RH +RL).
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payo¤ is 1
8
R2!. As a consequence, at date 1 party A will invest
~{B = argmax i[
1
2
R2H + (1  )
1
8
R2H ] + (1  i)[
1
2
R2L + (1  )
1
8
R2L] 
1
2
i2
= (1 + 3)
1
8
[R2H  R
2
L].
Now consider non-integration (o = A). Recall that if the parties do
not collaborate, at date 4 party A will exert e¤ort e(!) = r!, so at date 3
its disagreement payo¤ is 1
2
r2!, while party Bs disagreement payo¤ is zero.
When party A can make the o¤er at date 3, it will extract the date-5 return
R!, so party A will choose e
FB(!) = R! and its expected date-3 payo¤
is 1
2
R2!. Now suppose party B can make the o¤er. Party B will design a
contract according to which at date 5 party A will get a payment t  0. It
is again straightforward to check that party B will set t0 = 0 and t1 < 1.
Party A will accept the o¤er and exert e¤ort e = t1 if
1
2
t2
1
 1
2
r2!. Thus,
party B maximizes t1(R!   t1) subject to t1  r!. As a result t1 = r!, since
r! 
1
2
R!.
10 Therefore, at date 1 party A will choose the investment level
~{A = argmax i
1
2
[R2H + (1  )r
2
H ] + (1  i)
1
2
[R2L + (1  )r
2
L] 
1
2
i2
= 
1
2
(R2H  R
2
L) + (1  )
1
2
(r2H   r
2
L):
Note that ~{A = iA < iFB and iB < ~{B < iFB. Intuitively, under A-
ownership party As disagreement payo¤ is relatively large, so when party
B o¤ers a contract at date 3 party As participation constraint is binding.
Hence, party A does not get a rent compared to the situation in which there
is no moral hazard, so ~{A = iA. In contrast, under B-ownership party As
disagreement payo¤ is zero, so party A gets a rent when there is ex-post
moral hazard, implying that party A invests more than in the absence of
ex-post moral hazard, ~{B > iB.
10Note that when our assumption r!  R!=2 does not hold, then t1 = R!=2, so
additional case distinctions have to be made. In particular, ~{A can then be di¤erent from
iA. It is straightforward to analyze the cases ruled out by our assumption, which we have
made for brevity of the presentation only.
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Observe that ~{A > ~{B holds whenever r2H   r
2
L >
1
4
(R2H  R
2
L). Hence, the
following result holds.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is ex-post moral hazard.
(i) If r2H  r
2
L >
1
4
(R2H R
2
L), then the date-1 investment is strictly larger
under o = A than under o = B.
(ii) If r2H r
2
L <
1
4
(R2H R
2
L), then the date-1 investment is strictly larger
under o = B than under o = A. In particular, ownership matters even when
the investment i is fully relationship-specic (rH = rL).
Thus, in case (i) the conclusion is as in the standard Grossman-Hart-
Moore theory. Yet, in case (ii) it turns out that B-ownership yields higher
investment incentives, even though only party A has to make an investment
decision. The reason is that the expected rent that party A gets under B-
ownership in the case of ex-post moral hazard can be more responsive to
party As investment than party As positive disagreement payo¤ under A-
ownership. In particular, B-ownership leads to higher investment incentives
than A-ownership when the investment is fully relationship-specic; i.e.,
when the investment has an impact only on the collaboration surplus but
not on the disagreement payo¤s.
5 Conclusion
In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory, there are no ex-post
frictions. Yet, in transaction cost economics, ex-post frictions play a central
role. In this short paper, we have introduced ex-post moral hazard into the
Grossman-Hart-Moore theory. In contrast to the standard model, owner-
ship by the non-investing party can yield higher investment incentives than
ownership by the investing party. Moreover, even when the investments are
fully relationship-specic, ownership matters for the incentives to invest.
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